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COLLATERAL SOURCES OF INDEMNITY
ROBERT A. HENDERSON* & PATRICK F. MARONEY**
MEMBERS of our society strive to financially protect themselves
I from unforeseen circumstances causing illness or injury
through the purchase of adequate insurance coverage. However,
where there are multiple payers for the same injury, the question
arises as to how one provider of benefits obtains reimbursement from
the others. This issue of payments from, and reimbursement by, col-
lateral source providers was addressed by the 1993 Regular Session of
the Florida Legislature. After review and analysis, the Legislature
chose to revise one and repeal another of Florida's laws addressing
collateral sources of indemnity.' Committee Substitute for House Bill
975 repealed section 627.7372, Florida Statutes, which applied to ac-
tions arising out of the operation of a motor vehicle.2 Section 768.76,
Florida Statutes, which applies to non-motor vehicle actions arising
from tort or contract, was also revised by the same act.' In this Arti-
cle, the authors trace the history of Florida's collateral source laws
and discuss the latest enactment.
I. ORIGIN OF THE COLLATERAL SOURCE DOCTRINE
At common law, the collateral source rule prevented the defendant
from introducing into evidence other sources from which the plaintiff
had received reimbursement. As defined by one court, "[u]nder the
'collateral source rule,' benefits received by the plaintiff from a source
wholly independent of and collateral to the wrongdoer will not dimin-
ish the damages otherwise recoverable from the wrongdoer." '4 The
common law doctrine was codified in several states as a byproduct of
the "tort reform" of the 1980s.
* Legislative Counsel, United Services Automobile Association; B.A., 1974, University of
South Florida; M.B.A., 1976, University of Tennessee; J.D., 1982, Florida State University.
** Professor, College of Business, Florida State University; B.A., 1971, Florida State Uni-
versity; J.D., 1975, University of Florida.
1. Ch. 93-245, 1993 Fla. Laws 2436.
2. Id. § 3, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2439 (repealing FLA. STAT. § 627.7372).
3. Id. § 1, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2436 (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.76 (1991)).
4. Farley v. Engelken, 740 P.2d 1058, 1059 (Kan. 1987).
5. Specifically, Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illi-
nois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Mon-
tana, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island and Tennessee enacted tort reform
measures during the last decade that addressed issues involving the doctrine of collateral sources.
See INSURANCE INFO. INST., INSURANCE FACTS, 1987-88 PROPERTY/CASUALTY FACT BOOK 60
(1987-88).
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Prior to October 1, 1993, Florida had three distinct statutory provi-
sions that each constituted a collateral source rule. 6 Two of the laws
addressed causes of action stemming from motor vehicle accidents, 7
while the third statute applied to other actions for damages arising
from tort or contract. 8
The Florida statutory scheme is somewhat complex and will be ex-
amined by reviewing these three distinct statutory provisions that ap-
ply to collateral sources of indemnity.
II. FLORIDA'S COLLATERAL SOURCES OF INDEMNITY LAWS
A. The Collateral Source Provisions Applicable to Personal Injury
Protection Benefits
Under Florida's Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law, any owner or opera-
tor of a motor vehicle must obtain Personal Injury Protection [PIP]
coverage up to $10,000 for losses sustained as a result of bodily in-
jury, sickness, disease, or death arising out of the ownership, mainte-
nance, or use of a motor vehicle. 9 A person injured as a result of a
motor vehicle accident is entitled to eight percent of all reasonable
expenses for medical bills, sixty percent of any loss of gross income
and earning capacity, and death benefits of $5,000.10 An injured party
who is entitled to bring suit under the No-Fault Law is not entitled to
recover any damages for which PIP benefits are paid or payable."
Thus, the statute provides that the plaintiff may prove all of his spe-
cial damages notwithstanding this limitation, but, if such damages are
introduced into evidence, the trier of fact, whether judge or jury, can-
not award damages for PIP benefits paid or payable.12 In all cases in
which a jury is required to determine the existence of damages, the
court must instruct the jury that the plaintiff cannot recover special
damages for which PIP benefits have been paid or are payable." This
provision, section 627.736(3), Florida Statutes, which provides that
6. FLA. STAT. §§ 627.736(3), .7372, 768.76 (1991 & Supp. 1992).
7. Id. §§ 627.736(3), .7372 (1991 & Supp. 1992).
8. Id. § 768.76 (1991).
9. Id. § 627.736(1) (Supp. 1992).
10. Id. § 627.736(1)(a)-(c).
11. Further, no insurer shall have a lien on any recovery in tort by judgment, settlement, or
otherwise for PIP benefits, regardless of whether suit has been filed or settlement has been
reached by the parties. Id. § 627.736(3).
12. Id.
13. Id. Allowing the jury to deduct the amount of the award by the amount of PIP benefits
paid would serve as a disincentive for the claimant to obtain the required amount of coverage
pursuant to the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law.
COLLA TERAL SOURCES
PIP benefits cannot be included in an award for negligence, was not
amended by the 1993 Legislature.
B. Collateral Sources of Indemnity Applicable to Motor Vehicle
Accidents Other Than PIP Situations
The second collateral source provision applicable to motor vehicle
accidents was found in section 627.7372, Florida Statutes. This provi-
sion will be referred to hereinafter as the auto rule. Originally enacted
in 1977, this collateral sources of indemnity law provided that all spec-
ified collateral sources paid to the claimant before trial were admissi-
ble into evidence in automobile tort actions.' 4
When enacted, the auto rule provided: "In any action for personal
injury or wrongful death arising out of the ownership, operation, use
or maintenance of a motor vehicle, the court shall admit into evidence
the total amount of all collateral sources which have been paid to the
claimant prior to the commencement of the trial.' ' 5 Any amounts
paid by the claimant to secure the collateral source were also admissi-
ble. 16 Collateral sources were defined as any payments made to the
claimant, or on his behalf, pursuant to the United States Social Secu-
rity Act, any federal, state, or local income disability act, and any
other public programs providing medical expenses, disability pay-
ments, or other similar benefits. 7 Collateral sources also included any
health, sickness or income disability insurance, automobile accident
insurance that provided health or disability benefits, except life insur-
ance, any contract of any group or organization to pay for the costs
of any health care services, and any contractual or voluntary wage
contribution plan provided by employers which provided wages to the
claimant during a period of disability. 8
The auto rule was expanded the following year to require the court
to instruct the jury to deduct from its verdict the value of all benefits
received by the claimant from any collateral source. 19 This broadening
of the law required the court to admit into evidence the total amount
of all collateral sources paid to the claimant prior to the commence-
ment of trial.20 The Legislature also removed the requirement that the
14. Ch. 77-468, § 34, 1977 Fla. Laws 2057, 2081 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.7372 (1977)).
15. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.7372(1) (1977)).
16. Id.
17. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.7372(2) (1977)).
18. Id.
19. Ch. 78-374, § 5, 1978 Fla. Laws 1041, 1043 (amending FLA. STAT. § 627.7372(l)).
20. Id. The legislative staff advised that this expansion of the collateral source rule should
assist in the reduction of the amount of final verdicts. However, an exact economic impact was
not determined as the ultimate savings depended upon the reported frequency and severity of
projected accidents. Staff of Fla. S. Comm. on Com., CS for SB 1308 (1978) Staff Analysis 2
(final June 1, 1978) (on file with comm.).
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court admit into evidence any amount paid by the claimant to secure
the collateral sources. 2 1
In 1979, the definition of a collateral source was amended to ex-
clude any benefits received under the Workers' Compensation Act.2
The effect of the change was to ensure that the claimant would receive
full workers' compensation benefits in addition to any amounts recov-
ered from the tortfeasor or his insurer.
While addressing Florida's mandatory PIP requirement, the 1985
Legislature revised the definition of a motor vehicle to exclude any
type of vehicle used as a taxicab or limousine.23 Owners of these types
of vehicles would not be required to maintain PIP coverage. 24 How-
ever, the previous all-inclusive definition of a motor vehicle (including
taxicabs and limousines) would still be applicable for actions subject
to the collateral source rule.25 Thus, any first-party benefits (other
than PIP coverage) provided under an insurance policy covering the
occupants of a taxicab or limousine would still be deemed collateral
sources for purposes of section 627.7372.
In 1986, the Legislature again revised the definition of collateral
sources to specifically exclude benefits received under the Medicaid
program of Title XIX of the Social Security Act. 26 Any benefits re-
ceived from any medical services program administered by the Depart-
ment of Health and Rehabilitative Services were also carved out of the
definition. 27 These changes comported with the 1979 revision exclud-
ing workers' compensation benefits from any collateral source offset.
The net effert of restricting the collateral source definition was to en-
sure that those claimants who are entitled to certain first-party gov-
ernmental health benefits based on their income still would be allowed
to collect their full benefits from the government as well as the total
amount of damages from the tortfeasor.
The law was next revised in 1989 when the Legislature further
amended the definition of collateral sources to exclude benefits re-
ceived by the claimant under Medicare or any other federal program
that provided for a federal government lien on the plaintiff's recov-
21. Ch. 78-374, § 5, 1978 Fla. Laws 1041, 1043 (amending FLA. STAT. § 627.7372(1)).
22. Ch. 79-40, § 115, 1979 Fla. Laws 215, 301 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.7372(3) (1979)).
23. Ch. 85-320, § 1, 1985 Fla. Laws 1937, 1937 (amending FLA. STAT. § 627.732(l)(b)).
24. At the time, common carriers from South Florida contended that the legislation was
necessary because private passenger PIP insurers had subrogation rights against the owner or
insurer of commercial vehicles, yet the owner or insurer of commercial motor vehicles did not
have subrogation rights against insurers of private passenger vehicles. Staff of Fla. S. Comm. on
Com., CS for SB 713 (1985) Staff Analysis 3 (rev. June 19, 1985) (on file with comm.).
25. Ch. 85-320, § 1, 1985 Fla. Laws 1937, 1937 (amending FLA. STAT. § 627.732(l)(b)).
26. Ch. 86-220, § 70, 1986 Fla. Laws 1603, 1660 (amending FLA. STAT. 627.7372(3)).
27. Id.
COLLATERAL SOURCES
ery. 2 Any benefits received under such a program would not be ad-
mitted into evidence to reduce the jury awards.
In 1993, the Legislature repealed the auto rule, effective October 1,
1993.29 After that date, section 768.76, Florida Statutes, will be the
only collateral source rule in effect besides the provision specific to
PIP benefits.
C. Collateral Sources of Indemnity Applicable to Tort and Contract
Actions
Section 768.76 was enacted as part of the Tort Reform and Insur-
ance Act of 1986.30 This collateral source law applies to any action for
damages, whether in tort or contract, arising on or after July 1,
1986.1' However, to the extent it conflicts with any other provision of
the Florida Statutes (e.g., the PIP collateral source rule), the other
law applies. 32 This rule will be referred to hereinafter as the general
collateral source rule.
The general collateral source rule was similar to the auto rule in that
collateral source payments were to be considered in any action in
which damages were awarded in determining the total amount
awarded to the claimant. However, whereas the auto rule required the
court to instruct the jury to deduct from its verdict the value of all
collateral source benefits received by the claimant, under the general
rule, the court is to reduce the award by the total amount of the col-
lateral source payments.33
The effect of the first-party payor's right to subrogation for any
benefits provided to the claimant also differentiates the two rules. The
general rule does not allow the claimant's award to be reduced based
upon amounts recovered from collateral sources for which a right of
subrogation exists.34 However, the auto rule provided that the pro-
ceeds from the collateral source offset the claimant's damages regard-
less of the existence of the first-party payor's right of subrogation. 35
28. Ch. 89-203, § 1, 1989 Fla. Laws 839, 839 (amending FLA. STAT. § 627.7372(3)).
29. Ch. 93-245, § 3, 1993 Fla. Laws 2436, 2439 (repealing FLA. STAT. § 627.7372).
30. Ch. 86-160, § 55, 1986 Fla. Laws 695, 751 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.76 (Supp.
1986)).
31. FLA. STAT. § 768.76 (Supp. 1986).
32. Id.
33. The primary distinction between the provisions of the general collateral source rule and
the auto rule is that under the general rule, the jury is not informed of payments to the plaintiff
from collateral sources and is not instructed to deduct from its verdict (or, alternatively, not
award) the value of collateral source benefits received or payable. Under the statutory scheme
envisioned by the general rule, the court rather than the jury reduces the verdict by the amounts
of collateral sources paid or available, and juries are unaware of the receipt of collateral sources.
34. FLA. STAT. § 768.76(1) (Supp. 1986).
35. Id. § 627.7372(1) (1991).
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After reducing the award by any collateral source benefits received,
the general rule applies an offset to the extent of any amount paid,
contributed or forfeited by the claimant or a member of the immedi-
ate family to secure the right to any collateral source benefit re-
ceived.3 6 The general rule defines collateral sources as any payments
made to the claimant pursuant to the Social Security Act, any federal,
state, or local income disability act, any health, sickness or income
disability insurance, except life insurance benefits, any contract to
provide health care services, and any. employee wage continuation
plan." The general rule also provides that benefits received under the
Medicaid program of Title XIX of the Social Security Act, or from
any medical services program administered by the Florida Department
of Health and Rehabilitative Services, are not considered a collateral
source .8
Under the general rule, a claimant's attorney's contingent fee is
based on the net amount of the award reduced by the amount of any
money received from collateral sources.39 Additionally, a provider of
collateral sources that has a right of subrogation will have a right to
be reimbursed by a claimant to whom collateral sources were pro-
vided, if the claimant recovered all or part of the collateral sources
from a tortfeasor. 40 The provider's right of reimbursement is limited
to its pro rata share of collateral sources provided, minus the pro rata
share of costs and attorneys' fees incurred by the claimant in recover-
ing amounts from the tortfeasor.4 1 In determining the provider's pro
rata share of costs and attorneys' fees, the provider must deduct from
its recovery that percentage that constitutes the percentage of judg-
ment or settlement for costs and the attorneys' fees.42
When the Florida Legislature enacted section 768.76 in 1986, it was
aware that a case was pending before the Florida Supreme Court con-
cerning the constitutionality of section 627.7372. In Blue Cross & Blue
Shield v. Matthews, the plaintiff sued a tortfeasor alleging that the
tortfeasor's negligent operation of his vehicle seriously injured the
plaintiff.43 Blue Cross sought to intervene in the suit to recover over
$18,000 it had paid for health care. The trial court denied intervention
36. Id. § 768.76(1) (Supp. 1986).
37. Id. § 768.76(2).
38. Id.
39. Id. § 768.76(3).
40. Id. § 768.76(4).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. 498 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1986).
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on the basis that, since section 627.7372 barred the plaintiff from re-
covering these collateral source payments, Blue Cross was also pre-
cluded from recovering such amounts." The district court affirmed
the trial court, finding that the statute did not deny equal protection
and was not preempted by the Employment Retirement Income Secu-
rity Act.45
On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
statute did not bar the subrogation rights of the health care insurer.4
Therefore, the constitutional and preemption issues were obviated.
In Matthews, the court addressed whether section 627.7372, which
prohibited double recovery by an insured tort victim in a motor vehi-
cle accident, also prohibited recoupment by the health insurer from
the tortfeasor. 47 The court found that section 627.7372 did not bar a
cause of action by an insured or his insurer." The court also distin-
guished the effects of the No-Fault Law on liability insurers from the
effects on health insurers. The court wrote that liability insurers re-
ceive both benefits and detriments:
[I]n other words, losing the right to sue other motor vehicle insurers
is washed out by gaining the right not to be sued by other such
insurers. This equitable arrangement breaks down, however, if the
other insurer is a health insurer. The arrangement becomes a one-
way transaction with the health insurers always transferring money
to the vehicle insurers. The motor vehicle insurance industry would
benefit from transferring part of its claims cost to the health
insurance industry which might, conceivably, result in lower vehicle
insurance rates. However concerned it was with high motor vehicle
insurance rates, we do not believe the legislature intended to disguise
the costs of such insurance by transferring part of the burden to the
health insurance industry and its customers. 49
Thus, the court held that section 627.7372 did not bar the health in-
surer from recovering from the tortfeasor the costs of benefits paid to
the insured. 0
As part of a major legislative enactment on insurance reform, a
five-member task force was created in 1986 to study Florida's tort and
insurance laws. 5' The Academic Task Forde for Review of the Insur-
44. Id. at 422.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. The court also stated: "We see no reason in law or equity why a health insurer
should not be entitled to a single recovery of costs caused by the tortfeasor." Id. at 423.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Ch. 86-160, § 63, 1986 Fla. Laws 695, 756-59.
19931
578 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITYLAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:571
ance and Tort Systems was charged with examining Florida law and
the possible impact of the tort and insurance law changes contained in
the 1986 Act.5 2 The task force consisted of the presidents of both state
universities that have law schools, the president of a private university
that has schools of law and medicine, plus two other members ap-
pointed by these three.5 3 As part of their review, the task force exam-
ined the general collateral source rule and the auto rule, and discussed
the elimination of the right of subrogation by the first-party insurer.5 4
The task force found that subrogation by a first-party provider
should keep down the cost of first-party insurance.55 While elimina-
tion of the right of subrogation might reduce the cost of liability in-
surance, such a reduction in third-party coverage would occur only at
the expense of increasing first-party coverage. 6 Thus, consumers
would realize no additional savings in the cost of insurance if subroga-
tion rights were abolished, except for the elimination of transaction
costs incurred in obtaining subrogation. 7
Based on the above reasoning, the value of subrogation was found
to be the equitable reassignment of costs between payers of first-party
insurance and payers of liability insurance.58 Consequently, the task
force recommended that the right of subrogation be retained.5 9
The task force also examined whether the collateral source offset
calculation should be performed by the judge or jury. 6° In making its
decision, the task force referred to a survey of attorneys in which
forty-eight percent of those responding thought it made no differ-
ence. 61 Upon reviewing responses from defense attorneys, forty per-
52. Id.
53. Id. The Task Force members consisted of Marshall Criser, President of the University
of Florida; Bernard Sliger, President of the Florida State University; Edward Foote It, President
of the University of Miami; Preston Haskell; and P. Scott Linder. See ACADEMIC TASK FORCE
FOR REVIEW OF THE INSURANCE AND TORT SYSTEMS, FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS (Mar. 1, 1988)
[hereinafter ACADEMIC TASK FORCE].
54. ACADEMIC TASK FORCE, supra note 53, at 74.
55. Id. at 75.
56. Id.
57. Id. The task force concluded that such transaction costs would be insignificant com-
pared to overall system costs because the right of subrogation is perfected only after the higher
costs of establishing third party liability have been determined. Id.
58. Id. at 76. The task force also found that if first party insurers do not consistently exer-
cise their right of subrogation in actions in which damages are awarded, the plaintiff will receive
a windfall. Any moneys not recovered by the first party insurer are costs incurred by such pro-
vider. Id. at 75.
59. Id. at 76.
60. Id. Again, the task force operated from a lack of empirical data as to which approach
would hold down the cost of liability insurance. Id.
61. Id.
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cent thought that having juries make the offset would reduce costs,
while thirty-eight percent thought that having judges make the offset
would reduce costs.62 As to plaintiffs' attorneys, four times as many
respondents thought that having judges make the offset would reduce
costs.
63
The task force noted that having a uniform procedure for both the
general and auto collateral source statutes would reduce the number
of jury instructions and thus the possibility for confusion and mis-
take.- However; since the statutes employed different procedures, a
comparative study may be helpful to determine the optimum ap-
proach. 65
The task force concluded that neither the auto collateral source rule
nor the general collateral source rule should be changed as to who
ultimately should make the offset of collateral source payments. 66
III. 1993 REVISIONS TO FLORIDA'S COLLATERAL SOURCE LAWS
The most recent revision to the general collateral source rule oc-
curred in 1993 when the Legislature restricted the type of payments
that qualify as collateral sources, expanded the exemption for calcu-
lating the offset, and established requirements for recovering benefits
paid by a collateral source provider.67
62. Id.
63. Id. at 76-77.
64. Id. at 77. The Motor Vehicle Insurance Task Force of 1989 shared this concern with the
task force. See MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE TASK FORCE OF 1989, REPORT 35 (Mar. 30, 1990).
65. While it can be argued that a jury, unaware of the collateral sources paid to a claimant,
is more inclined to return a higher verdict than one aware of such collateral sources, such a result
will not necessarily occur. An empirical study that used mock juries tested the hypothesis that
jury verdicts would be reduced if juries were instructed not to award for, or to decrease the
judgment by, collateral sources of recovery. Some believe that juries will reduce the overall
amount awarded just because they are aware that the plaintiff has already received compensation
for out-of-pocket expenses. The study found that juries did not respond to changes in the treat-
ment of collateral source recovery by the plaintiff in the manner anticipated. The hypotheses
that informing the jury of the plaintiff's recovery from collateral sources and instructing it to
deduct that recovery from the award would result in lower jury verdicts was not supported by
the data. However, the degree of injury and the amounts of collateral sources provided may
have affected the result. Patrick F. Maroney, Jack M. Nelson & Pamela L. Perrew6, Modifica-
tion of the Collateral Source Rule, 8 J. INs. Rac. 408, 415-21 (June 1990).
66. ACADEMIc TASK FORCE, supra note 53, at 77.
67. Ch. 93-245, § 1, 1993 Fla. Laws 2436, 2436 (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.76). Committee
Substitute for House Bill 975 amended section 768.76, Florida Statutes, which applied to collat-
eral sources of indemnity in situations other than motor vehicle accidents. However, it would
appear that effective October 1, 1993, this general collateral source rule will apply to collateral
sources in motor vehicle accident situations as well. The statutory law for PIP benefits, section
627.736(3), Florida Statutes, will continue to apply as well since it was not addressed by the
Legislature in 1993.
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Benefits paid pursuant to Title XVIII and Title XIX of the Social
Security Act are excluded from the statutory definition and are not
deemed to be collateral sources.6 Payments prohibited by federal law
and those expressly excluded by law as collateral sources are also not
included in the definition. 69 Additionally, benefits received under
Medicare, or any other federal program providing for a federal gov-
ernment lien on the plaintiff's recovery, as well as the workers' com-
pensation law, are not considered collateral sources. 0
The law also expands the exception to the collateral source offset
for which a right of subrogation exists to sources which have a right
of reimbursement. 7' Additionally, the provider's right of reimburse-
ment will be limited to the actual amount of collateral sources recov-
ered by the claimant, less its pro rata share of costs and attorney's
fees incurred by the claimant in recovering damages from the tortfea-
sor.72 Any disputes between the claimant and the provider as to
amounts recovered by the claimant from the tortfeasor will be subject
to court determination. 7 In determining the amount of collateral
sources recovered by the claimant, the court must consider offsetting
the amount of settlement or judgment for any comparative negligence
of the claimant, amount of liability insurance available to the tortfea-
sor, or any other factors which the court deems appropriate. 74
The law imposes new requirements on both parties regarding the
collection of benefits from the claimant by the collateral source pro-
vider. First, the claimant must send the collateral source provider, by
certified or registered mail, notification of the claimant's intent to
claim damages from the tortfeasor. 75 Additionally, the notice must in-
clude a statement that the provider of collateral source benefits will
waive any right to subrogation or reimbursement unless it provides a
statement, in which it asserts payment of benefits and right of subro-
68. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.76(2)(a)l.).
69. Id.
70. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.76(2)(b)).
71. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.76(1), (4)). Committee Substitute for House Bill 975
also amended section 641.31, pertaining to health maintenance contracts. The bill provided that
a health maintenance organization providing benefits or payments to a subscriber who suffers
illness or injury by virtue of the negligent act of a third party is entitled to reimbursement from
the subscriber in accordance with section 768.76(4). Id. § 2, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2438 (amending
FLA. STAT. § 641.31(8)).
72. Id. § 1, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2436 (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.76(4)).
73. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.76, to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.76(5)).
74. Id.
75. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.76, to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.76(6)). If suit has
been filed by the claimant at the time notice is sent, a copy of the complaint against the tortfea-
sor must be sent with the notice. Id.
COLLATERAL SOURCES
gation, within thirty days following receipt of the claimant's notice. 76
Further, a provider will have no right of subrogation or reimburse-
ment for collateral source payments made after the date of waiver,
settlement or judgment. 7
Finally, a collateral source provider claiming a right of subrogation
or reimbursement must cooperate with the claimant. 7 A court may
consider failure to cooperate in determining the right to, or amount
of, reimbursement. 79
IV. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1993 LAW
House Bill 975 was sponsored by Representative Tracy Stafford"°
and introduced in the Florida House of Representatives on February
9, 1993.81 Upon introduction, the bill was referred to the Committees
on Judiciary and Appropriations."2 On February 11, 1993, the bill was
referred to the Subcommittee on Court Systems, Probate and Con-
sumer Law where it was placed on the Subcommittee's agenda for
February 15, 1993.3 At the Subcommittee meeting, the bill was favor-
ably reported and was placed on the February 17, 1993, agenda of the
House Committee on Judiciary. 4
At the meeting of the Committee on Judiciary, the bill was
amended to remove the provision that insurers and health mainte-
nance organizations have no right to subrogation or reimbursement
unless they can establish that monetary returns on subrogation claims
have been factored into the insurance premiums charged. 5 Following
the adoption of the amendment, the Committee adopted a Committee
Substitute for House Bill 975 .86 Committee Substitute for House Bill
975 was then placed on the House Calendar and read for the first time
on March 2, 1993.87 The bill was read on the House floor a second
76. Id.
77. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.76, to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.76(8)).
78. Id. (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.76, to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.76(9)). Such
cooperation includes producing information necessary for the claimant to prove the nature and
extent of the value of the collateral sources provided.
79. Id.
80. Dem., Wilton Manors.
81. See FLA. H.R. JoUR. 89 (Reg. Sess. Feb. 9, 1993).
82. Id.
83. FLA. LEGIS., FINAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1993 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF
HousE BILLS at 236, CS for HB 975 (hereinafter HISTORY or HousE BILLS].
84. Id.
85. Staff of Fla. H.R. Comm. on Judiciary, CS for HB 975 (1993) Staff Analysis 5 (final
June 8, 1993) (on file with comm.).
86. HISTORY OF HoUsE BrLLs, supra note 83, at 236.
87. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 307 (Reg. Sess. Mar. 2, 1993).
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time on March 30, 1993, where it was amended to require that any
notice from the claimant to the collateral source provider of the clai-
mant's intent to seek damages from the tortfeasor must include a
tatement that the provider will waive any right to subrogation, unless
it provides the claimant with a statement asserting payment of benefits
and the right of subrogation within thirty days. 8 The same day, the
bill passed the House by a vote of eighty-three to thirty-two and was
sent to the Florida Senate.8 9 In the Senate, Committee Substitute for
House Bill 975 was referred to the Committees on Judiciary, Health
Care and Commerce. 90 On April 2, 1993, the bill was withdrawn from
all three committees, and substituted for Committee Substitute for
Senate Bill 1590. 91 At that time, on the Senate floor, an amendment
was offered to the House bill to expand the definition of collateral
sources to include uninsured motorist benefits. 92 The amendment
failed and Committee Substitute for House Bill 975 passed the Senate
by a vote of thirty-three to zero. 93 On April 29, 1993, the bill was
signed by the Senate President and the Speaker of the House and pre-
sented to the Governor." The Governor allowed the bill to become
law on May 15, 1993, without his signature. 9
V. CONCLUSION
Florida's new collateral source law will have a widespread effect on
all actions involving damages recovered by a claimant who is entitled
to multiple sources of benefits. Providers of collateral sources must
carefully adhere to procedural deadlines or waive their right to subro-
gation or reimbursement. Additionally, except where PIP benefits ap-
ply, causes of action stemming from motor vehicle accidents will no
longer be treated differently than any other tort or contract matter
involving a collateral source provider. Thus, the rule now provides
that when a collateral source carrier has a right of subrogation or re-
imbursement, the judge will not reduce the amount of the award by
the total amount that was paid for the benefit of the claimant from
collateral sources.
Although one uniform law may simplify compliance with the statu-
tory requirements for seeking recovery of amounts paid to a claimant
88. Id. at 993 (Reg. Sess. Mar. 30, 1993).
89. Id. at 994.
90. FLA. S. JOUR. 943 (Reg. Sess. Apr. 1, 1993).
91. Id. at 1119 (Reg. Sess. Apr. 2, 1993).
92. Id. Senator John Grant, Republican, Tampa, offered the amendment. Id.
93. Id.
94. HISTORY OF HouSE BILLS, supra note 83, at 236.
95. Ch. 93-245, § 4, 1993 Fla. Laws 2436, 2439.
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for damages caused by a third party, it will be interesting to examine
the future effect of the new collateral source law on the cost of motor
vehicle and health insurance in Florida.

